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Introduction
The past decade has witnessed a surge of empirical research on strategic interaction among local governments in the setting of tax rates, 1 expenditures on public services, 2 and standards and regulatory measures. 3 In particular, a strand of the literature has explored the issue of welfare competition. 4 In the presence of welfare recipients' mobility, decentralised welfare policies would be set strategically, in the sense that an authority would look to neighboring jurisdictions' bene¯t levels before setting its own to avoid becoming a \welfare magnet," and would respond to the policies enacted by its neighbors, leading to a race to the bottom and a possible erosion of the welfare state (Sinn [48] ).
The existing empirical literature on decentralised welfare policy setting typically uses US state data and relies on the race to the bottom notion. 5 It tests for inter-state welfare competition, by estimating a reduced-form reaction function where the bene¯t level in a state is related to a weighted average of neighboring states' bene¯t levels. 6 As far as EU countries are concerned, while it is rarely the case that welfare policies are set in a decentralised way -with most redistributive policies being decided at the national level, -still in several instances local authorities provide social services that a®ect the well-being of the poor.
In the UK, for instance, while the bulk of welfare policies is set at the 1 Ladd [36] , Besley and Case [8] , Case [21] , Heyndels and Vuchelen [32] , Brett and Pinkse [14] , Brueckner and Saavedra [18] , Buettner [19] , Revelli [39] , Bordignon et al. [12] . 2 Case et al. [22] , Kelejian and Robinson [35] , Murdoch et al. [38] , Bivand and Szymanski [10] , [11] , Revelli [41] , [42] , Baicker [5] . 3 Brueckner [15] , Fredriksson and Millimet [30] , [31] . 4 Smith [49] , Shroder [47] , Smith [50] , Rom et al.
[43], Figlio et al. [29] , Saavedra [44] , Wheaton [53] , Bailey and Rom [6] , Berry et al. [7] . 5 Brueckner [16] reviews the empirical welfare competition literature. 6 Shroder [47] and Berry et al. [7] represent exceptions, in that they estimate structural models including a bene¯t setting equation and a recipiency ratio (poverty rate) determination equation.
national level (minimum income guarantee, jobseeker's allowance and housing bene¯ts), yet local authorities devote a share of total revenues to social expenditures, in terms of care and assistance to the elderly, help to families and children with social needs, as well as a number of services to people with disabilities and health needs (Social Services Inspectorate [51] ).
In¯nancial year 2000/2001,
7 English local authorities spent over $10 billion on personal social services, corresponding to 20% of total local spending and amounting to almost half of expenditure on education (CIPFA [23] ).
While most of the above social services do not typically take the form of a money transfer to the poor, still they mainly bene¯t low-income households, in that the need for social services tends to be correlated with income deprivation (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions [28] ).
An interesting feature of local spending on personal social services in the UK is that it shows positive spatial auto-correlation, in the sense that the policies of nearby localities -that is, of localities sharing a border -appear to be more correlated than those of far-away ones. For instance, in¯nan-cial year 2000/2001 the standard measure of spatial dependence, the Moran statistic (Anselin [1] ), de¯nitely rejects the hypothesis that the location of an authority does not a®ect its social service provision policy.
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This paper aims at exploring the causes of such spatial auto-correlation.
In the light of the welfare competition literature cited above, one could wonder whether the spatial pattern in social spending in the UK is the outcome of a similar sort of competition. However, the mobility of the bene¯ciaries of personal social services is likely to be rather low, virtually ruling out the 7 In the UK, the¯nancial year starts on 1st April and ends on 31st March. 8 The Moran test is a sort of spatial Durbin-Watson statistic that represents a measure of the similarity in value (covariance) and association in space (contiguity). It is asymptotically normally distributed under the null hypothesis of absence of spatial auto-correlation (Anselin [1] ). When computed on a raw measure of social service provision across the 146 English local authorities providing social services (the level of social expenditure per bene¯ciary), the Moran test yields a value of 0.68, with a standard normal value of 16.8, meaning that one can con¯dently reject the null of no spatial auto-correlation. On the other hand, it can be argued that a spatial pattern in social expenditures might arise from the existence of a local \informational" externality, even in the absence of the threat of welfare-induced migration. The idea is that information about local public service provision in the neighborhood is both relevant -because neighboring jurisdictions face a similar socio-economic environment and are likely to experience similar shocks -and easily available, because it naturally tends to spill over into adjacent jurisdictions (Besley and Case [8] ). As a result, the local information spill-over would make it possible for imperfectly informed citizens to improve politicians' selection, by evaluating the performance of their own government relative to the performances of governments in nearby localities (Case [21] ).
Furthermore, as well as a®ecting selection, comparative performance evaluation would also a®ect politicians' discipline: as a result of the spill-over from neighboring jurisdictions, o±cials would exert more e®ort in order to enhance their performance relative to their neighbors. The discipline effect of comparative performance evaluation would therefore generate a sort of \yardstick competition" among local authorities, with o±cials mimicking the behavior of nearby governments.
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The main objective of this paper is to ascertain whether the observed spatial pattern in local welfare spending in the UK can indeed be attributed to the discipline e®ect of yardstick competition, or if it can alternatively be explained either by welfare competition or by the fact that neighboring authorities are hit by correlated shocks (Manski [37] ).
In order to accomplish this aim, this paper exploits the institutional change that occurred in the UK in October 2001, when the Department of Health (DoH) announced the introduction of a system of Social Services Performance Rating (SSPR). The SSPR would produce every year, starting 9 The idea of yardstick competition in a political agency framework was¯rst put forward by Ladd [36] , Case [21] and Case et al. [22] , and formalised by Besley and Case [8] .
from May 2002, a statistical overview of the performance and rating of each council on a zero to three stars scale, based on the full range of available evidence in the previous¯nancial year.
The interesting aspect of the SSPR is that its objective is \to ensure that social care issues are properly addressed, to promote good practice and to identify councils that are performing poorly (...) The ratings are intended to improve public information about the current performance of services (...)
People have a right to know how well their councils are performing in meeting these responsibilities, whether they are receiving such services themselves, have a family member receiving such services, or are a council tax payer."
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If the main objective of the SSPR is to improve public information about local government performance in social service provision, then it could be argued that the mimicking e®ect arising from local information spill-overs should play a less important role after its introduction. In the presence of a national system of performance evaluation, the relevance of the performances of neighboring authorities decreases, since information is made easily available on nation-wide practice in social service provision. Consequently, analysing the degree of spatial auto-correlation in welfare spending before and after the introduction of the SSPR should allow us to conclude whether yardstick competition was indeed responsible for the observed spatial pattern.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of the determination of local spending on personal social services, and section 3 discusses the econometric issues involved in empirically implementing it. Section 4 presents the estimation results, based on data for the 146 UK local governments that provide social services. Finally, section 5 provides some further testing of the yardstick competition hypothesis, section 6 explores whether the political complexion of local jurisdictions can help explain their policy-making processes and spatial interaction patterns, and Total population in the jurisdiction is:
The government in each jurisdiction is in charge of providing social services. The g i non-taxpayers directly bene¯t from expenditures on social services, that are funded by the property taxes paid by the h i taxpayers.
While it is reasonable to think that taxpayers represent the majority of the resident population (h i > g i ), and do not directly bene¯t from social spending (but rather pay its cost), still there are a number of reasons why they could favour social expenditure.
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The taxpayer's utility -equation (1) -depends on her own private consumption (y i ) and on the indirect bene¯ts she receives from social expenditure (s i ), with c i representing a vector of J community characteristics:
Denoting by x i and m i the levels of per capita social expenditures and per capita (lump-sum) central government grants, and assuming that the local government budget constraint must be balanced, the taxpayer's budget constraint can be expressed as:
where:
is the tax price of local public spending on social services.
As for the bene¯t taxpayers get from social expenditure, it is reasonable to assume (along with most of the welfare competition literature) that it depends on social spending per bene¯ciary, that is total social expenditure (X i ) divided by the number of bene¯ciaries (g i ):
Given equations (2) and (3) above, the budget constraint can be rewritten as:
where: e q i = q i +¿ i m i is \full" income including central government grants
equals the usual recipiency ratio (Shroder [47] ).
Utility maximisation subject to the budget constraint yields a demand function for social services (s i ) that, following the common practice in applied local public economics, can be written in log-linear form as:
where¸q is the income elasticity,¸r is the price (recipiency ratio) elasticity and " i is a random term.
Local interaction in social policy making
In the presence of a decentralised welfare system and welfare recipients' mobility, the recipiency ratio in each jurisdiction would be determined endogenously, in that it would depend on social service provision in jurisdiction i (s i )
as well as on social service provision in nearby jurisdictions. Following the spatial econometrics literature (Anselin [1] ) as well as the recent empirical works on local strategic interaction (Brueckner [17] ), assume that the e®ect on jurisdiction i of the welfare policies enacted in the neighborhood can be expressed as a spatially weighted average of neighboring jurisdictions' expenditures, with non-stochastic weights w in > 0 for adjacent (border sharing) 7 jurisdictions i and n (i; n = 1; :::; N). 13 Using again a log-linear speci¯cation, the recipiency ratio can be expressed as:
where°s > 0 and°¡ s < 0. After taking logarithms, equation (6) is an expression similar to equation (13) in Shroder [47] .
Replacing the expression for the recipiency ratio in equation (5), one obtains a reduced form reaction function that expresses a¯rst-order spatial auto-correlation process in s i with parameter¯¡ s :
where:¯j
Equation (7) is commonly estimated in the empirical welfare competition literature, where a non-zero estimate of parameter¯¡ s is taken as evidence of welfare competition. Unfortunately, though, spatial auto-correlation in local expenditures is compatible with alternative theoretical explanations.
Yardstick competition arising from a local information spill-over is one of them (Bordignon et al. [12] ).
The basic idea underlying yardstick competition is that voters are imperfectly informed about the actual cost required for providing public services, and policymakers are heterogeneous with respect to e±ciency in public service provision, in the sense that some politicians are more prone to waste resources or to divert public revenues to private aims.
14 In a decentralised system of government, though, it is possible for imperfectly informed voters to improve selection of politicians, by evaluating the e±ciency of their own government relative to governments in nearby localities. Moreover, as a result of the information spill-over from neighboring jurisdictions, o±cials would exert more e®ort in order to enhance their performance relative to their neighbors, and would end up mimicking the policies of nearby governments (Besley and Case [8] ).
The discipline e®ect of comparative performance evaluation can be introduced into equation (5) by allowing the level of spending in jurisdiction i to be a®ected by a measure of expenditures in nearby localities:
n , where w in are positive non-stochastic weights on neighboring jurisdictions' expenditures (Case et al. [22] ). Positing now that the recipiency ratio r is exogenous, equation (5) can be expressed as:
Equation (9) formalises the idea that a government can a®ord to set high expenditures if its neighbors select high spending levels -as the information spill-over conveys in that case the signal of a high cost of social services due to exogenous factors over which politicians have no control -while it will be forced to set low expenditure levels if neighbors' expenditures are low. Hence, the spending level in a jurisdiction will tend to be positively correlated (® 1 > 0) with the expenditures in the neighborhood. 15 Clearly, since both equation (7) and equation (9) include a spatial lag of the dependent variable ( P N n=1 w in ln(s n )) among the explanatory variables, it is not possible to discriminate between a welfare competition model and a yardstick competition model by means of estimation of a spatial reaction function only.
While, as argued above, the features of the UK system of welfare make a migration-induced race to the bottom unlikely, still this paper provides a way to discriminate among the two theories, by analysing the impact of the introduction of the national performance assessment system on local interaction patterns.
If spatial auto-correlation were due to welfare competition -parameter ¡s in equation (7) -then the introduction of the national performance assessment system should have no e®ect on it, because it does not a®ect the incentives for local authorities to compete with their neighbors to avoid inmigration of welfare recipients.
On the other hand, if local information spill-overs were responsible for the observed spatial auto-correlation in social spending -parameter ® 1 in equation (9) -then one should observe less spatial auto-correlation after the introduction of the performance assessment system based on uniform national standards.
Empirical implementation
Turning to estimation of a spatial reaction function such as (9), standard methods -OLS (ordinary least squares) -are biased because own and neighbors' spending levels are determined simultaneously (Anselin [1] ). Moreover, the presence of a spatial process in the error term could give the wrong impression of strategic interaction, even if none is really occurring (Brueckner [15] ).
To see how estimation is carried out, consider equation (10) below -the matrix form analogue of (9) -expressing a SAR (spatial auto-regressive) process in the dependent variable:
where W is the row-standardised (N £ N) matrix of spatial weights w in .
C is a (N £ (J ¡ 1)) matrix of exogenous variables, ® ¡1 is a ((J ¡ 1) £ 1)
vector of parameters to be estimated, e q and r -representing income and recipiency ratio respectively -are (N £ 1) vectors, and all variables are in logarithm.
The well-known econometric problem that arises in the estimation of equation (10) consists in separately identifying parameter ® 1 , expressing an endogenous interaction e®ect, and a potential spatial process in the error term ":
where the (N £ 1) vector of error terms " is allowed to have a SMA (spatial moving average) structure with parameter ½, with j½j < 1, whileí s a (N £ 1) vector of innovations, with E(´´0) = ¾ 2 I.
The identi¯cation problem is due to the fact that the spatial processes in (10) and (11) tend to mimic each other, so that the presence of correlated shocks might be mistaken for an endogenous interaction e®ect (Case [20] ). 16 Basically, two approaches exist for getting consistent estimates of the spatial parameter ® 1 in (10). The¯rst one is based on an IV (instrumental variables) principle, and consists in¯nding variables that are correlated with neighbors' endogenous variable (Ws), while not being correlated with ". 17 IV is based on the idea of removing the bias-generating correlation between the endogenous regressor Ws and the error term " (Kelejian and Prucha [34] ): [8] ). Moreover, the IV approach has the advantage of allowing us to control for potential endogeneity of further r.h.s.
variables in (10), such as the recipiency ratio.
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The second approach is based on an ML (maximum likelihood) principle and consists in inverting the spatial reaction function (10) (Case et al. [22] ):
with: Z = [C; e q; r] and ± 0 = [® 0 ¡1 ;¸q;¸r]. ML is more e±cient, because it allows us to control for the spatial process in the error term explicitly. In fact, the full model represented by equations (10) and (11) 
with log-likelihood function:
where c ¼ is a constant, and jJ ½ j = jI + ½Wj and jJ ® j = jI ¡ ® 1 Wj are the Jacobian terms of the transformation between´and s (Anselin [2] ).
In order to learn about the relative importance of the two spatial processes driven by parameters ® 1 and ½ respectively, and in particular to ascertain whether the introduction of the performance assessment system has a®ected the spatial interaction pattern in social expenditures, the next section shows estimates of the spatial reaction function that are based on IV and ML principles, both before and after the introduction of the ratings system. The dependent variable is computed as total expenditure on personal social services in a jurisdiction, divided by the number of income deprived residents as a proxy for the number of users of social services. While the SSPR is based upon and is intended to improve the quality of social service provision -that might not necessarily be correlated with the level of expenditure -the hypothesis we wish to test here is whether local authorities react to the The explanatory variables include central government lump-sum grants, residential property tax base per capita as a proxy for income (income data not being available at the local level), size and density of population, and the percentages of old and young residents over total population. The recipiency ratio is computed as the ratio of income deprived people to taxpayers.
Data and estimation results
However, if the recipiency ratio were in fact determined endogenously due to welfare competition, both the price elasticity and the spatial autoregressive coe±cient would be estimated with a bias. Consequently, IV estimation of (10) uses variables re°ecting the economic structure of a locality -proportion of properties that are not devoted to domestic use (commercial and industrial) and value of non-domestic property per capita -as instruments for the recipiency ratio. While the above variables are likely to re°ect reasonably well the economic complexion of a jurisdiction and are highly correlated with the recipiency ratio, they can be reasonably thought of as changing sluggishly over time, and consequently being exogenous at least in the short run. The results of estimation of equation (10) Finally, the estimates of the crucial spatial parameters yield consistent results. The ML estimate of ® 1 in the SAR speci¯cation that does not allow for correlated errors -column 2 in table 3 -is 0.18. As expected, it is lower than the OLS estimate of ® 1 , because OLS does not control for simultaneity of own and neighbors' decisions. The IV estimate and the ML estimate of ® 1 that controls for a spatial pattern in the error term -columns 3 and 4 2 4 Twice the di®erence between the log-likelihoods of the restricted and unrestricted models is distributed as a Â 2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions -number of spatial parameters set to zero (Anselin [1] ). 2 5 Moreover, when the residuals from a¯rst stage regression of the recipiency ratio on the matrix of instruments are inserted into equation (10) as a regressor (a Hausman endogeneity test), the coe±cient on the residuals is not estimated to be signi¯cantly di®erent from zero (F (1 ;134 ) test = 2.8), suggesting that the recipiency ratio can be treated as exogenous in (10) .
in table 3 -yield an elasticity of about 0.20, while spatial dependence in the residuals (parameter ½) is estimated to be negative, but not statistically signi¯cant. It is interesting to notice that the OLS bias turns out to be very small, suggesting that the upward OLS bias provoked by positive spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variable (the term W(I ¡ ® 1 W) ¡1 in equation (12)) is almost fully o®set by the downward OLS bias determined by negative correlation in the residuals (the term (I + ½W)(I+ ½W) 0 ¾ 2 in equation (12)). Moreover, the likelihood of a model that restricts ® 1 to be constant across the four waves is signi¯cantly lower than the likelihood of an unrestricted model that allows ® 1 to be di®erent in the latter cross-section, with the LR test reported at the bottom of table 5 rejecting the restriction of a constant ® 1 at the 99% level of con¯dence.
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Overall, the above evidence consistently suggests that spatial correlation in local expenditures on social services has dropped considerably. In par-ticular, it supports the idea that, by spreading information on nation-wide practice in social service provision, the SSPR has diminished the relevance of local information spill-overs and weakened the incentives for local authorities to mimic the policies of neighboring jurisdictions.
Politics
The above analysis might be missing an important point, by disregarding the role of politics in the local expenditure determination process. In particular, it could be argued that local jurisdictions should be more strongly a®ected by the policies enacted by governments that are controlled by the same political 2) t statistics in parentheses;
3) ® 1 = auto-regressive coe±cient on spatially lagged dependent variable:
equation ( 2) t statistics in parentheses;
equation ( 
